Now that your team has gone through the Tear-Down to generate Draft Currency, the next step in the rebuilding process is the most difficult to sustain: The Wallowing Years.
Bottoming out is a natural progression of exchanging present wins for potential future wins. Moving above replacement-level NHL bodies for draft picks will leave your organization with an NHL roster comprised mainly of replacement-level and below talent. An entire roster of below-replacement-level talent will yield a roster whose fortunes are set before the games even begin.
A rebuilding organization is competitive by the desire and willingness to rebuild in the first place. Most organizations in the NHL are not genuinely interested in being competitive, evidenced by the largely directionless means by which they lurch from season to season. If rebuilding organizations turn into contenders, organizations that refuse are pretenders.
Canadian teams are an example of this stance, operating under the accurate assumption that gate receipts are independent of organizational success. They are under no burden of competitiveness. The guise of pretending is enough to maintain financial viability. Most American franchises do not have this luxury. Gate receipts and ticket prices are driven by competitiveness in most American markets, which is why most organizations that have undergone rebuilds in the last twenty years have been American.
Competitive organizations rely on these pretenders to farm draft currency at an enhanced rate and push rebuilding organizations down the standings into prime draft pick territory. The wallowing years require losing continuously to these teams. These losses propel the pretenders up the standings, making them likelier suitors for the remaining auctionable pieces on a rebuilding roster, worsening their draft selection range.
The most challenging temptation of the wallowing years is trying to prematurely pull your organization out. It is difficult to embrace full seasons of measured, acknowledged, and planned uncompetitive games, but that is the exact requirement of the wallowing years. Not only does a premature exit of the wallowing years require exchanging potential future wins for present wins, but it also sabotages the opportunity cost of high draft selections with the highest potential to be organizational fixtures for a decade or more.
Most rebuilds that fail do so during the wallowing years. The pressure to compete is one thing, but the pressure to not be terrible is quite another. Most of the teams in the league are content to skate by as “not terrible.” The illusion of competitiveness is an easier position to pursue and sustain than actual competitiveness. Avoiding consecutive bottom finishes and the media attention it generates is a powerful intoxicant for a front office. The temptation to exit the wallowing years prematurely is not just a test for the front office. It’s a test for the entire organization, but ultimately it is a test of ownership.
Whether a team follows through on a rebuild by enduring the wallowing years reflects whether ownership is genuinely interested in being competitive. A team constantly “re-tooling” is an organization led by unserious ownership.