A tear-down will tell you much about an organization. Outside of luck, the most significant determinant factor for the length and quality of a rebuild is how the organization positions itself in the tear-down period. Unlike tanking, a “tear-down” is a multi-season approach to selling players for picks and, critically, acquiring more players to cycle through for later seasons. The point isn’t to bottom out; it’s to accumulate draft pick assets over a series of years in almost whatever form they come packaged in.
When starting a rebuild, if given the option to draft high or draft frequently, draft frequently. A rebuilding organization may attempt to tank towards the end of their rebuild, with the understanding that they believe their organization is short a key star component available in the draft. Like tanking in general, this should be ancillary to the rebuilding process and the management of contracts. Once you’re ready to pay your young superstars, your organization should be free of future salary liability and, thus, the talent necessary to keep from drafting in the top three. Drafting too high at the start of a rebuild is not advisable due to the risk that an elite talent propels you out of the rebuilding stage too early.
Players as Commodities
A good tear-down involves timing the market. Teams in the tear-down stage are the market movers: motivated sellers of high-value commodities available to the largest pool of suitors. Teams amid a tear-down can strike while the iron is hot, knowing that short-term on-ice improvements are primarily inconsequential to the seller completing a deal. Like other commodity sales, keeping supply low and prices high is critical. This is one reason teams owe it to themselves to make the decision to rebuild well before the end point of significant contracts on their roster: increasing your luck surface area over several years will do more to improve the health of your organization than all your draft eggs in one draft-year basket yielding a star.
When it comes time to move a superstar, it’s essential not to flood the market with another superstar also on offer. It’s more advantageous to pick twice in the first round in consecutive years than four times in a single draft at the start of your organization’s downward trajectory. Moving superstars in consecutive years should yield a more significant wave for each draft year. A monster wave too early in the process could give a false impression of the overall strength of the prospect pool and its readiness to compete. Too many good players on offer dilute the market, and managing the options and terms of trades for multiple precious and cap-heavy players is strenuous on management resources.
Take, for example, the attempted tank by the Calgary Flames. In 2013, after missing the playoffs for three years, in another down year, Flames ownership and management were jolted into rebuilding by the surprise refusal of captain and organizational superstar Jarome Iginla to re-sign. Facing losing him for nothing as a pending free agent, the Flames navigated the trade restrictions in his contract and traded him to his preferred destination, Pittsburgh. The circumstances around the trade were murky and made in haste with a quickly approaching deadline. The return for the former two-time Rocket Richard Trophy winner was relatively insignificant.
Days later, the Flames traded Jay Bouwmeester, a player with another year left on his contract, who had a disappointing tenure in Calgary but remained an elite defender. The trade to St.Louis yielded a similar return as the Iginla trade, a 2013 1st-round draft pick and 2 prospects. The return for Bouwmeester was immediately panned, arguably even worse of a return given the nature of Bouwmeester’s contract situation.
Charting a new course on such a tight deadline for the first time in a decade could not have been easy. The Flames had prioritized a quick turnaround over addressing years of organizational mismanagement. GM Jay Feaster made it clear the Flames were looking to rebound fast. Referring to the opportunity provided by newly acquired cap space, Feaster said, “we're going to have an opportunity to get better quickly," following the trades. “If they [St. Louis] make the playoffs, and we certainly hope that they do ... that's three first-round picks in the '13 draft,"
Along with their own pick, the Flames had stacked two more 1st-round picks in the 2013 draft with the returns for Iginla and Bouwmeester while already missing their 2013 2nd-round pick from a prior year trade. Adding Bouwmeester and Iginla to their respective teams improved those clubs, devaluing the quality of the 1st-round picks the Flames received, eventually picking 22nd and 28th OA with those picks that combined to play nine total NHL games. The following year, year two of the “retool,” the Flames would draft just six times, with another underwhelming result despite the organization’s highest-ever draft pick.
Trying to navigate the loss of such a critical off-the-ice component of the organization on the fly is no easy task. Orchestrating a delicate and substantial moment for an organization should be considered well out of a deadline and planned for accordingly. Moving beloved players with notable tenure is never easy, but it’s easiest when everyone is on the same page and working together for common goals.